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I.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE.
When Plaintiff-Appellant Tifani Wattenbarger ("Tifani")' first opened an account with

Defendant-Respondent A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc. ("A.G. Edwards")' in 1993, she agreed in
writing that all controversies between A.G. Edwards and her would be resolved by arbitration.
Plaintiffs-Appellants Wattenbargers ("Plaintiffs") brought their action against DefendantsRespondents A.G. Edwards and Gene Gillette ("Gillette") (collectively "Defendants") in
violation of Tifani's agreement to arbitrate. The District Court correctly found that Tifani had
agreed to arbitrate, and therefore dismissed Plaintiffs' case. The District Court also correctly
awarded to Defendants their costs and attorneys' fees incurred to enforce Tifani's agreement to
arbitrate and to achieve a complete dismissal of Plaintiffs' action.
B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS.
On or about December 20,2007, Plaintiffs filed their Complaint and Demand for Jury

Trial ("Complaint"). R. Vol. 1 at 5-15. On February 28, 2008, counsel for Defendants alerted
Plaintiffs' counsel that the claims in the Complaint were subject to arbitration. R. Vol. 3 at 287

77 4-5,292-96.

On September 22,2008, Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP filed a Notice of

'

At the time of the events relevant to this appeal, Tifani was known as Tifani Clement.
R. Vol. 1 at 55 7 3; R. Vol. 2 at 93-96.
The name of A.G. Edwards has changed over time as a result of corporate acquisitions
and mergers. A.G. Edwards is now known as Wells Fargo Advisors, LLC, and at the time it first
appeared in this case, was then known as Wachovia Securities, LLC. R. Vol. 1 at 20-A.
Because the name "A.G. Edwards" was used at the time of the events relevant to this appeal, the
name "A.G. Edwards" will be used lbroughout this brief.
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Appearance on behalf of Defendants. R. Vol. 1 at 20-A-20-C. On October 8,2008, because
counsel for Defendants had been unsuccessful in persuading Plaintiffs' counsel that Plaintiffs
must arbitrate their claims, R. Vol. 3 at 287-88

7 6, Defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss or,

in the Alternative, to Stay and Compel Arbitration ("Motion to Dismiss"). R. Vol. 1 at 51-53.
On January 22,2009, the District Court entered an order granting the Motion to Dismiss, thereby
dismissing Plaintiffs' case in its entirety ("Dismissal Order"). R. Vol. 2 at 190-91.
I-Iaving achieved a complete dismissal of Plaintiffs' action, Defendants filed their
Memorandum of Costs, Disbursements, and Attorneys' Fees on February 5,2009, requesting
attorneys' fees and costs in the amount of $18,883.91. R. Vol. 2 at 199-202. On April 6,2009,
the District Court entered an order awarding Defendants a total of $15,197.41 in attorneys' fees
and costs ("Attorneys' Fees Award"). R. Vol. 3 at 323-24.
C.

STATEMENT OF FACTS.
1.

1993: Tifani Agrees to Arbitrate All Controversies with Defendants.

While Plaintiffs focus on events that occurred in 1995, the key facts for this appeal are
actually the events that took place in 1993. In 1993, Tifani and her then-husband Shan Clement
("Shan") went to the A.G. Edwards office in Pocatello to meet with Gillette concerning potential
investments. R. Vol. 1 at 55 13. During the initial meeting with Gillette, Tifani decided to
establish an Individual Retirement Account ("IRA") at A.G. Edwards in her own name and
contributed $250 to the IRA, which then represented the maximum allowable amount for a nonworking spouse's contribution to an IRA. R. Vol. 1 at 56 7 4; R. Vol. 2 at 131 7 2.
In accordance with the standard procedure of A.G. Edwards, Gillette prepared a "New
Account Card" for Tifani. R. Vol. 1 at 56 7 5,63. The New Account Card contained an A.G.
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Edwards IRA 1 SEP [Simplified Employee Pension] Adoption Agreement ("Adoption
Agreement"). R. Vol. 1 at 63. The Adoption Agreement on the New Account Card expressly
referred to A.G. Edwards's "Custodial Account Agreement": "THE CUSTOMER MUST
RECEIVE AND READ THE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT AND CUSTODIAL
AGREEMENT PRIOR TO COMPLETING THIS AGREEMENT." R. Vol. 1 at 56 7 6,63.
Furthermore, the following language appeared at the bottom of the New Account Card:

I hereby adopt the A.G. Edwards 13Sons, Inc. Custodial Account
Agreement; provided, that the Custodial Account Agreement shall
be in force if and only if this Adoption Agreement is accepted [by
A.G. Edwards] below.

By signing this agreement, I acknowledge that this agreement
contains a binding and enforceable arbitrationprovision on page
21 in paragraph 13 ofArticle XII of the Custodial Account
Agreement.
R. Vol. 1 at 57 7 8, 63 (emphasis added). Tifani signed the New Account Card on March 3 1,
1993, thereby expressly adopting the arbitration provisions found in the Custodial Account
Agreement. R. Vol. 1 at 56 7 5,57 7 8,63; R. Vol. 2 at 94 7 6. Gillette, as the Investment
Broker, and Mark Buckalew, as the Branch Manager, also signed the New Account Card
indicating that the Adoption Agreement entered into by Tifani was "approved and accepted by"
A.G. Edwards. R. Vol. 1 at 57 7 8,63. As explicitly referenced in the Adoption Agreement set
forth on the New Account Card, the Custodial Account Agreement contains "a binding and
enforceable arbitration provision" ("Arbitration Agreement"). R. Vol. 1 at 57 1 8,63, 86 1 13.
Specifically, the Arbitration Agreement provides that the parties agree that "all controversies
between" them arising from "any cause whatsoever. . . shall be determined by arbitration":
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(13) The Depositor [Tifani] agrees and, by carrying any
account for the Depositor, the Custodian [A.G. Edwards]
agrees that all controversies between the Depositor and the
Custodian or any of the Custodian's present or former officers,
directors, agents or employees wlzich may arise for any cause
whatsoever, shall be determined by arbitration. ..

.

This arbitration provision shall apply to any controversy or claim
or issue in any controversy arising from events which occurred
prior, on or subsequent to the execution of this arbitration
agreement. . . .

R. Vol. 1 at 58-59

7 11, 86 7 13 (italicized emphasis added, bold text in original). The Custodial

Account Agreement also explained that arbitration is "final and binding on the parties" and that
the "parties are waiving their right to seek remedies in court":
(12) The following disclosure is required by various regulatory
bodies but shall not limit the applicability of the following
arbitration provision to any controversy or claim or issue in any
controversy or claim which may arise between the Depositor and
the Custodian:

(a) ARBITRATION IS FINAL AND BINDING ON
THE PARTIES.
(b) THE PARTIES ARE WAIVING THEIR RIGHT TO
SEEK REMEDIES IN COURT, INCLUDING THE
RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL. .

..

R. Vol. 1 at 58 7 lo, 86 7 12 (italicized emphasis added, bold text in original).
2.

1995: Continuation of the Relationship Established in 1993.

In early 1995, Gillette first learned from Tifani's brother-in-law (also a client of
Gillette's) of the untimely accidental death of Tifani's then-husband Shan. R. Vol. 2 at 131 7 3.
After learning of Shan's death, Gillette contacted Tifani to express his condolences and to advise
her of important paperwork changes that would need to be made to consolidate Shan's IRA into
her IRA and to update the beneficiaries on her own IRA. R. Vol. 2 at 131-32

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF - 4

77 3-5.

During

the course of Gillette's conversations with Tifani regarding the required paperwork changes with
respect to the IRAs, Tifani expressly told Gillette that she wanted Gillette to assist her in
investing the approximately $160,000 remaining balance of the $200,000 in life insurance
proceeds that she had received upon Shan's death "'because Shan trusted you."' R. Vol. 2 at
131-32

7 5.

Even though she had no obligation to continue doing business with A.G. Edwards

or Gillette following Shan's death, Tifani thus chose to continue the relationship with A.G.
Edwards and Gillette that had begun with the opening of her IRA in 1993. Id.
During the course of their extensive financial planning discussions in early 1995, Tifani
told Gillette that she knew that she would someday remarry. R. Vol. 2 at 132 7 6. Tifani
therefore specifically instructed Gillette that, from the approximately $160,000 in Shan's life
insurance proceeds then at her disposal, she wanted to place $15,000 into long-term accounts for
the lifetime financial protection of each of her two children ($30,000 total) and that she did not
want those funds to be at any risk of access by a future stepfather. Id. Even though Gillette
almost never recommended annuities-Gillette

recalls only one other special-circumstances

client other than Tifani to whom he did make such a recommendation-in

Tifani's particular

circumstances, and in light of her specifically articulated objectives of (i) providing long-term
financial security to her children and (ii) preventing access to the funds by a future husband,
Gillette concluded that the use of annuities was an appropriate course of action. R. Vol. 2 at
132-33

7 6.

Gillette described to Tifani the basis for his recommendation, and Tifani gave him

her approval to proceed. Id. Tifani's directive to Gillette with respect to the $15,000 set-aside
for each child was for one purpose only-namely,
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to provide a long-term (indeed, lifelong)

financial security exclusively to each of her children in a manner that would be protected from
access by any potential future husband that Tifani might marry.3 R. Vol. 2 at 134 7 8.

11.
ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Whether Defendants are entitled to attorneys' fees on appeal pursuant to the

parties' agreement (in the Custodial Account Agreement) andlor Idaho Code § 12-120(3)

111.
ARGUMENT
A.

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS' CASE.
1.

Standard of Review.

"[Mlatters outside the pleading [were] presented to and not excluded by the [District
Court]" in conjunction with Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. I.R.C.P. 12(b). See R. Vol. 1 at
54-92; R. Vol. 2 at 93-1 11, 127-29, 130-36, 172-74. Therefore, the Motion to Dismiss was'
effectively converted into a motion for summary judgment.
Nevertheless, whether the District Court treated the Motion to Dismiss as a summary
judgment motion or not, the standard of review for this Court is the same. "In reviewing [a]
district court's order granting [a] motion to dismiss, the standard of review is the same as that
used in summary judgment." Gibson v. Ada County, 142 Idaho 746,751, 133 P.3d 1211, 1216

Gillette also specifically discussed with Tifani the need for her financial planning to
take into account the funding of her children's hture college education expenses. R. Vol. 2 at
133 7 7. Although Tifani and Gillette formulated a pIan in 1995 for Tifani to fund her children's
future college education, by investing each month a portion of each child's monthly Social
Security benefit, it appears that Tifani never actually followed through on the plan. Id. Further,
Tifani never had any discussions with Gillette concerning any potential future church mission
expenses for either of her children. R. Vol. 2 at 134 i/ 8.
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(2006). "The standard of review on appeal from an order granting summary judgment is the
same standard that is used by the district court in ruling on the motion." Id.
Therefore, the dispositive questions before this Court are (1) whether there is anything in
the record that shows the existence of a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Tifani
entered into an agreement to arbitrate, and (2) whether, as a matter of law, Tifani entered into an
agreement to arbitrate that encompasses the claims in Plaintiffs' Complaint.
2.

The District Court's Alleged Failure to Treat Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
as a Motion for Summary Judgment Is Not Reversible Error.

Contrary to Plaintiffs' assertion, the District Court's alleged "failure" to treat the Motion
to Dismiss as a summary judgment motion is not a basis for vacating the Dismissal Order.
Appellants' Brief ("Aplts.' Br.") at 15-16. First, as discussed in Section III.A.l above, the
standard of review for this Court of the Dismissal Order is unaffected by whether or not the
District Court "converted" the Motion to Dismiss into a summary judgment motion, because the
standard of review in either case is the standard relevant to a motion for summary judgment.

Gibson, 142 Idaho at 751, 133 P.3d at 1216.
Second, "failure" to convert the Motion to Dismiss into a summary judgment motion is
not a reversible error. In Goodman v. Lothrop, 143 Idaho 622, 151 P.3d 818 (20071, this Court
reviewed a decision on a motion that "functioned as a motion to dismiss." Id. at 626, 151 P.3d at
822. Because "the district court went beyond the contents of the pleadings," this Court pointed
out that "the district court's ruling must be treated as a motion granting summary judgment." Id.
However, while the "district court did not follow the formalities of [a summary judgment]
ruling," id., this Court did not vacate the dismissal. Instead, this Court simply determined that
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the standard of review on appeal was the standard applicable to a summary judgment motion. Id.
And ultimately, this Court afirmed the district court's dismissal. Id. at 628, 151 P.3d at 824.
Thus, the alleged "failure" of the District Court to formally convert the Motion to Dismiss into a
summary judgment motion is not, by itself, a ground to vacate the Dismissal Order.
Third, while the District Court may not have formally converted the Motion to Dismiss
into a summary judgment motion, Plaintiffs fail to point to anything in the record showing that
the District Court's ruling was inconsistent with the summary judgment standard. The best that
Plaintiffs can claim is that "[iJt is unclear from the district court's decisions if it in fact
recognized that summary judgment standards applied in this case." Aplts.' Br, at 16 n.67
(emphasis added). Even if the District Court did not expressly convert the Motion to Dismiss
into a summary judgment motion, it did consider all the materials submitted by both sides in
judging whether any fact dispute would prevent a judgment of dismissal for ~ e f e n d a n t s . ~
Fourth, and most importantly, Plaintiffs did not raise before the District Court any
genuine issues of material fact that would prevent summary judgment for Defendants. As
discussed in detail in Section IILA.3 below, the material facts in this case are undisputed:
Tifani signed the New Account Card, adopted the Custodial Account Agreement,
and agreed to the Arbitration Agreement. R. Vol. 1 at 57 T/ 8,63.
The Arbitration Agreement unambiguously requires that Plaintiffs arbitrate "all
controversies" between Tifani and Defendants "which may arise for any cause
whatsoever." R. Vol. 1 at 58-59 7 11, 86 7 13.

For example, the District Court considered the factual assertion made in the affidavits of
Tifani and Jared (and not in their Complaint) that they had converted their separate property into
community property. R. Vol. 2 at 180; R. Vol. 2 at 96 T/ 16, 127-28 T/ 4.
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Plaintiffs did not dispute these facts before the District Court. R. Vol. 2 at 112-26. Because
there were no genuine issues of material fact before the District Court, the District Court did not
err even if it did not fonnally convert the Motion to Dismiss into a summary judgment motion.
3.

The District Court Correctly Found that Tifani Had Entered into a Binding
Agreement to Arbitrate and that the Arbitration Agreement Encompassed
the Claims in Plaintiffs' Complaint.

The District Court correctly found that Tifani entered into a valid agreement to arbitrate
her disputes with Defendants and that the agreement covered the claims made by Plaintiffs.
a.

Arbitration Is Favored, and the Arbitration Agreement Must Be
Enforced As with Any Contract.

Plaintiffs' attempt to paint a disparaging picture of arbitration agreements is contrary to
the applicable law and policy that actuallyfavors arbitration. The Federal Arbitration Act
("FAA"), which governs the Arbitration ~ ~ r e e m e nwas
t , ~enacted "[tlo overcome juaicial
resistance to arbitration" and "embodies the nationalpolicy favoring arbitration and places
arbitration agreements on equalfooting with all other contvacts." Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc.

v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440,443 (2006) (emphasis added). In fact, the FAA "manifest[s] a liberal
federal policy favoring arbitration agreements," E.E.O.C. v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279,
289 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted), that requires courts to "rigorously enforce
agreements to arbitrate." Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213,221 (1985).

The Arbitration Agreement states that it is governed by the FAA, R. Vol. 1 at 58-59
Thus, the enforceability of
the Arbitration Agreement is determined by turning to the FAA, namely 9 U.S.C. $ 2. See
Moore v. Omnicare, Inc., 141 Idaho 809, 815, 118 P.3d 141, 147 (2005) (recognizing that parties
may agree by contract as to which arbitration laws shall apply).

7 11, 86 7 13, a fact that Plaintiffs acknowledge. Aplts.' Br. at 22.
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Under the FAA, a court's role is "limited to determining (1) whether a valid agreement to
arbitrate exists and, if it does, (2) whether the agreement encompasses the dispute at i ~ s u e . " ~

Chiron Corp. v. Ortho Diagnostic Sys., 207 F.3d 1126, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000). "If the response is
affirmative on both counts, then the [FAA] requires the court to enforce the arbitration
agreement in accordance with its terms." Id. (emphasis added).
b.

There Is No Genuine Issue of Material Fact as to Whether Tifani
Entered into the Arbitration Agreement, and as a Matter of Law, the
Arbitration Agreement Is a Valid Agreement.

There is nothing in the record showing the existence of any genuine issue of material fact
as to whether Tifani entered into the Arbitration Agreement. Furthermore, based on the
undisputed facts in the record and under Idaho law related to the incorporation of another writing
by reference, as a matter of law, an enforceable agreement to arbitrate was created between
Tifani and A.G. Edwards. The District Court, therefore, did not err in finding that Tifani was
bound by the terms of the Arbitration Agreement.
First, there is no dispute that Tifani actually signed the Adoption Agreement on the New
Account Card. R. Vol. 1 at 56 7 5, 57 7 8, 63; R. Vol. 2 at 94 7 6 (stating that Tifani "signed a
New Account Card").
Second, because the Adoption Agreement expressly incorporated by reference the
Custodial Account Agreement (including specifically its Arbitration Agreement), when Tifani

While the FAA provides that arbitration agreements are as fully enforceable as any
contract, 9 U.S.C. § 2, to decide whether a valid arbitration agreement exists, and whether it
includes the claims at issue, a court is to "apply ordinary state-law principles that govern the
formation of contracts." First Options ofChicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995);
Mason v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 145 Idaho 197,200 n. 1, 177 P.3d 944,947 n. 1 (2008).
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signed the Adoption Agreement, she agreed to the terms of the Arbitration Agreement. An
"unsigned writing" may "be read together with a signed writing" where "express reference in a
signed writing [is made] to an unsigned writing." Hoflman v. S V Co., Inc., 102 Idaho 187, 190,
628 P.2d 218,221 (1981) (explaining that "Idaho follows the doctrine than an unsigned writing
may be considered as part of' the parties' agreement "only where express reference to [the
unsigned writing] is made in a signed writing"); 17A Am. Jur. 2d Contracts 5 392 (2008).
Incorporation by reference applies to arbitration agreements: "An arbitration agreement
is not invalid or unenforceable merely because it is contained in a document incorporated into
the contract by reference." In re RaymondJames & Assocs., Inc., 196 S.W.3d 31 1, 318 (Tex. Ct.
App. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, arbitration provisions found in a
writing that the parties have not signed are binding on the parties as long as the parties' signed
writing expressly references the unsigned writing containing the arbitration provisions. See, e.g.,

Loomis, Inc. v. Cudahy, 104 Idaho 106, 107 & n.1, 108,656 P.2d 1359, 1360 & n.1, 1361 (1982)
(affirming the district court's confirmation of the arbitration award where the parties' arbitration
clause explicitly referred to, but did not detail, the applicable arbitration r u ~ e s ) . ~
Indeed, courts have held on facts very similar to those in this case that an arbitration
agreement in a separate, unsigned agreement is incorporated by express reference into the

See also e.g., Nobles v. Rural Cmty. Ins. Sevvs., 122 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1299 (M.D. Ala.
2000); Paley Assocs., Inc. v. Universal Woolens, Inc., 446 F. Supp. 212,214 (S.D.N.Y. 1978);
Northcom, Ltd v. James, 848 So. 2d 242,244,246 (Ala. 2002); McDougle v. Silvernell, 738 So.
2d 806,806-09 (Ala. 1999).

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF - 11

parties' contract. In Raymond James, when the plaintiffs opened their accounts with Raymond
James, they signed a New Account Form with the following statement:
By signing below, I acknowledge that I have received, read,
understand and agree to abide by all the terms and conditions set
forth in the Client Agreement incorporated herein by this
reference. The Client Agreement contains a binding arbitration
clause and other provisions substantially affecting my rights. . . . I
have detached and retained the Client Agreement for my records.

Raymond James, 196 S.W.3d at 315 (emphasis added). On these facts, the appellate court held
that the arbitration clause in the Client Agreement, plainly referred to in the New Account Form,
was incorporated by reference and that the plaintiffs were compelled to arbitrate. Id at 3 19.
Another case, Kadow v. A.G. Edwards &Sons, Inc., 721 F. Supp. 201 (W.D. Ark. 1989),
is of particular interest because of its similarity to this case. Kadow involved an A.G. Edwards
adoption agreement similar to the Adoption Agreement that Tifani signed. Id. at 202-03. The
signed adoption agreement in Kadow expressly incorporated a separate and unsigned custodial
account agreement containing an arbitration provision. Id. The court held that the arbitration
agreement was part of the parties' agreement and was enforceable. Id. at 204.
In this case, there is no dispute that the Adoption Agreement expressly incorporated by
reference the Custodial Account Agreement, including the Arbitration Agreement found therein:
"THE CUSTOMER MUST RECEIVE AND READ THE DISCLOSURE
STATEMENT AND CUSTODIAL AGREEMENT PRIOR TO COMPLETING THIS
[ADOPTION] AGREEMENT." R. Vol. 1 at 56 1 6 , 6 3 (emphasis added).

"I hereby adopt the A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc. Custodial Account Agreement. . . ."
R. Vol. 1 at 57 7 8, 63 (emphasis added).
"By signing this agreement, I acknowledge that this agreement contains a binding
and enforceable arbitration provision on page 21 in paragraph 13 ofArticle XII o f
the Custodial Account Agreement." Id. (emphasis added).
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Thus, the Arbitration Agreement is expressly incorporated into the Adoption Agreement between
Tifani and A.G. Edwards, and Plaintiffs are bound by the terms of the Arbitration Agreement.
Third, the District Court correctly concluded that Jared was bound by the Arbitration
Agreement, even though he did not sign the Arbitration Agreement. Plaintiffs' argument that
Jared is not bound by the Arbitration Agreement ignores Jared's relationship to this case. Aplts.'
Br. at 25. The actions that Plaintiffs allege gave rise to their claims occurred entirely in 1995four years before Jared and Tifani were married-and

involved Tifani's own separate property,

and were based solely on Tifani's relationship with Defendants. R. Vol. 1 at 7-8,YY 11-20; R.
Vol. 2 at 94-96

1/5/ 9-16.

Therefore, Jared's standing, if any,* necessarily arises out of his

relationship with Tifani: Jared has no relationship with Defendants, Defendants owed no duty to
Jared, and Defendants did not make any representations to Jared. R. Vol. 1 at 59-60

7 13. Jared,

therefore, has no claim against Defendants independent of Tifani's claims, and his claims, if any,
are subject to the same limitations applicable to Tifani's claims. Jared cannot stand in Tifani's
place to bring a claim and then contend that the Adoption Agreement she signed does not apply
to him. If Tifani is bound by the Arbitration Agreement, Jared is also bound, even without his
signature. See Dan Wiebold Ford, Inc. v. Universal Computer Consulting Holding, Inc., 142
Idaho 235,241, 127 P.3d 138, 144 (2005) (explaining that a "nonsignatory can be bound to an
arbitration agreement under ordinary principles of contract"). It would be a very odd result if

'No allegations in the Complaint explain the right of Jared to assert the claims in the

Complaint pertaining to the investment of Tfani's assets made long before their marriage. Jared
has never been a client of Gillette at A.G. Edwards and has never opened or maintained any
account at the Pocatello office of A.G. Edwards. R. Vol. 1 at 59-60 ij 13.
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Tvani were required to arbitrate her claims against Defendants but Jared were not, even though
the only basis for his claims is through Tifani's contracts and relationship with Defendants?
c.

The District Court Was Correct in Finding that the Scope of the
Arbitration Agreement Includes the Claims in Plaintiffs' Complaint.

The District Court was also correct in concluding that the Arbitration Agreement
encompasses the claims made in Plaintiffs' Complaint. The Arbitration Agreement must be
treated as any contract in deciding whether it encompasses the dispute at issue. See Caley v.

Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 428 ~ . 3 1359,
d
1367-68 (1 lth Cir. 2005) ("The purpose of the
FAA is to give arbitration agreements the same force and effect as other contracts."). Thus, as
with any contract, the interpretation of the scope the Arbitration Agreement "begins with the
language of the contract itself." Cristo Viene Pentecostal Church v. Paz, 144 Idaho 304,308,
160 P.3d 743,747 (2007) (internai quotation marks omitted). "If the language of the contract is
unambiguous, then its meaning and legal effect must be determined from its words." Id.
"Determining whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law . . . ." Id
The Arbitration Agreement unambiguously states that Tifani must arbitrate "a11
controversies" with Defendants that "may arise for any cause whatsoever":

(13) The Depositor [Tifani] agrees and, by carrying any
account for the Depositor, the Custodian [A.G. Edwards]
agrees that all controversies between tlte Depositor and the

See Hawis v. Super. Ct., 233 Cal. Rptr. 186, 188 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that a
nonsignatory, third-party beneficiary to an arbitration agreement was required to arbitrate
because a "third-party beneficiary of a contract can gain no greater rights under [the] contract
than the contracting parties"); Berman v. Dean Witter & Co., Inc., 1 19 Cal. Rptr. 130, 133 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1975) (holding that the nonsignatory to the arbitration agreement, an agent of the
signatory, was required to arbitrate his claims because he, as agent, was "not entitled to any
greater right than his principal" who had signed the arbitration agreement).
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Custodian or any of the Custodian's present or former officers,
directors, agents or employees which may arisefor any cause
whatsoever, shall be determined by arbitration.

. ..

This arbitration provision shall apply to any controversy or claim
or issue in any controversy arising from events which occurred
prior, on or subsequent to the execution of this arbitration
agreement.

R. Vol. 1 at 58-59

7 11, 86 7 13 (italicized emphasis added, bold text in original). Because the

language regarding the scope of the Arbitration Agreement is not "reasonably subject to
conflicting interpretations," it is not ambiguous. Cristo Viene, 144 Idaho at 308, 160 P.3d at 747
(internal quotation marks omitted). When the Arbitration Agreement says that it includes "all
controversies" and "any controversy or claim," it means that it includes all controversies. For
example, in Anders v. Hometown Mortgages Services, Inc., 346 F.3d 1024 (I lth Cir. 2003), the
court analyzed the scope of the following arbitration provision: "'[Alny action, dispute, claim,
counterclaim or controversy ("Dispute" or "Disputes"), between us, including any claim based
on or arising from an alleged tort, shall be resolved. . . by ARBITRATION . . . ."' Id. at 1028.
Addressing this arbitration provision, the court held that the "agreement could not have been
broader. Any dispute means all disputes, because 'any' means all. And so, of course, does the
word 'all' itself. The agreement reaches this dispute because the agreement reaches any and all

disputes." Id (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In
Paine Webber Inc. v. Bybyk, 81 F.3d 1193 (2d Cir. 1996), with respect to the scope of the phrase
"any and all controversies" in an arbitration provision, the court stated that
[tlhe meaning of the ["any and all controversies" phrase] is plain
indeed: any and all controversies are to be determined by
arbitration. The wording is inclusive, categorical, unconditional
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and unlimited. The words "any and all" are elastic enough to
encompass disputes over whether a claim is timely and whether a
claim is within the scope of arbitration.
Id at 1199 (emphasis added). See also Pritzker v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 7
F.3d 1110, 1114 (3d Cir. 1993) ("The arbitration clauses at issue, however, govern 'all
controversies which may arise between [the parties].' Courts have broadly construed similar
agreements, interpreting them to apply to all disputes between signatories." (emphasis added)).
The Arbitration Agreement in this case unambiguously includes all controversies. Being
unambiguous as to its scope, the District Court properly applied the "meaning and legal effect"
of the words in the Arbitration Agreement and held that Plaintiffs' claims in the Complaint were
subject to arbitration. Cristo Viene, 144 Idaho at 308, 160 P.3d at 747.
Broad language in arbitration provisions, including language very similar to that in the
Arbitration Agreement, has been held to be valid and applicable to claims arising outside of the
contract in which the arbitration provision was found, including claims arising in relation to later
contracts or later-opened accounts. In A. G. Edwards & Sons, Inc. v. Myrick, 195 S.W.3d 388
(Ark. Ct. App. 2004), the customer opened an account in 1986, at which time he signed a new
customer's agreement containing an arbitration provision that provided as follows:
"ANY
BETWEEN THE lCUSTOMER1 AND
-CONTROVERSY
.
EDWARDS.. . ARISING OUT OF T H I ~ A G R E E M E ~OR
T
THE PERFORMANCE OR BREACH OF THIS AGREEMENT,
OR ANY ACCOUNT WITH EDWARDS, OR ANY
TRANSACTION BY THE rCUSTOMER1 WITH OR THROUGH
-

BE SETTLED BY ARBITRATION. . . ."
Id at 390 (emphasis added). Nine years later in 1995, the customer opened "custodial accounts
for [his] three children," at which time the customer "did not sign a new customer's agreement."
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Id (emphasis added). When the customer sued A.G. Edwards with respect to the children's
accounts, A.G. Edwards moved to compel arbitration based on the broadly worded arbitration
provision in the new customer's agreement signed in 1986. Id. at 391. The trial court denied the
motion to compel. Id. at 390. The appellate court, however, reversed and remanded, holding
that "the arbitration agreement [was] unambiguous and that it required the arbitration of any
controversy between [the customer and A.G. Edwards] arising from any account" with A.G.
Edwards. Id at 392. The court explained that the agreement's
scope was broad and expansive, covering "any controversy"
between the parties "arising out of this agreement or the
performance or breach of this agreement, or any account with
Edwards, or any transaction" by [the customer] with Edwards, "or
any other cause whatsoever. . . ." The agreement did not limit its
apdication to accounts that [the customer] opened in any particular
capacity or to accounts then in existence. Also, the parties did not
later create any document that expressly or by implication
excepted the custodial accounts from the terms of the arbitration
agreement, nor did they revoke the 1986 agreement.

Id. (emphasis added). The appellate court thus concluded that the 1986 agreement, including its
arbitration provisions, applied to the 1995 custodial accounts notwithstanding the assertion that
"the account cards created by Edwards in 1995 . . . did not reflect that those accounts were
subject to arbitration and did not refer to the 1986 agreement" and "that [the plaintiff] signed the
1986 agreement as an individual and opened the 1995 accounts as a custodian." Id. at 391.
Similar to the language at issue in Myrick, the language in the Arbitration Agreement is
broad and explicitly applies to "all controversies" between Tifani and Defendants "which may
arise for any cause whatsoever." R. Vol. 1 at 58-59

7 11, 86 7 13. There is no indication in any

document that the Arbitration Agreement is limited only to the IRA that Tifani opened in 1993,
or that the actions of Gillette with respect to the annuities purchased in 1995 were excepted from
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the Arbitration Agreement. Myrick, 195 S.W.3d at 392. In the absence of any such express
limitations, the Arbitration Agreement's explicit language that it applies to "all controversies"
means that the Arbitration Agreement does apply beyond claims arising solely from Tifani's IRA
opened in 1993 when Tifani adopted the Arbitration Agreement. Pursuant to the plain terms of
the Arbitration Agreement, Plaintiffs' claims against Defendants are thus subject to arbitration.
Furthermore, because the FAA governs, even if the Arbitration Agreement were held to
be ambiguous as to the scope of claims it covers, any interpretation would still result in the
arbitration of Plaintiffs' claims because the FAA requires that all ambiguities, if any, be resolved
in favor of arbitration. See Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd ofTrs. ofLelandStanfordJunior Univ.,
489 U.S. 468,475-76 (1989) ("[A]mbiguities as to the scope of the arbitration clause itself [must
be] resolved in favor of arbitration."); Moses H Cone Mem 'I Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp.,
460 U.S. l,24-25 (1983) ("[Alny doubts concerning the scope of the arbitrable issues should be
resolved in favor of arbitration [including] the construction of the contract language itself. . . .").
d.

Plaintiffs' Attempts to Limit the Scope of the Arbitration Agreement
Must All Be Rejected.

Plaintiffs raise several arguments in their attempt to limit the scope of the Arbitration
Agreement's express language. None of these arguments can succeed, however.
(1)

Plaintiffs Cannot Rely on Lovey to Argue that the Arbitration
Agreement Does Not Apply to the Claims in Their Complaint.

Plaintiffs rely heavily on Lovey v. Regence Blueshield ofldaho, 139 Idaho 37, 72 P.3d
877 (2003), to argue that the claims in the Complaint are not within the scope of the Arbitration
Agreement. Aplts.' Br. at 17,20-21; see also R. Vol. 2 at 117-21. For several reasons,
however, Plaintiffs' reliance on Lovey is misplaced. First, the Arbitration Agreement is
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governed by the FAA, not the Idaho Uniform Arbitration Act. R. Vol. 1 at 58-59

7 11, 86 7 13.

See also Aplts.' Br. at 22 (acknowledging that the FAA applies). Lovey, however, involves the
Uniform Arbitration Act, not the FAA, and, is not even interpreting tbe FAA. Lovey, 139 Idaho
at 41, 72 P.3d at 881. Because the FAA applies, it is the governing "substantive arbitration law,"
even in state court, Mason v. State Farm Mut. Aufo. Ins. Co., 145 Idaho 197,200 n. 1, 177 P.3d
944,947 n. 1 (2008), and the Uniform Arbitration Act and Idaho cases applying it, such as Lovey,
do not establish the applicable arbitration law. Lovey, therefore, is not applicable here.
Second, because the FAA applies, Idaho law cannot treat the Arbitration Agreement
differently from any other contract, and any limitations placed by Idaho law specifically on
arbitration agreements are invalid. See Caley, 428 F.3d at 1367 (explaining that, where the FAA
governs, it "preempts state law to the extent it treats arbitration agreements differently than other
contracts"). According to Plaintiffs, Idaho law, as found in Lovey, places limits specifically on
arbitration agreements.'' Because the holding of Lovey, according to Plaintiffs, purportedly
applies speczj?cally to the "scope of arbitration agreements," Aplts.' Br. at 17, any supposed
limitation in Lovey is preempted by the FAA and is invalid. Caley, 428 F.3d at 1367.
Finally, the facts in Lovey are not germane to this issue. Plaintiffs cite Lovey as providing
a "detailed analysis of what claims 'arising out ofor relating to ' a contract with an arbitration
clause is subject to arbitration." Aplts.' Br. at 17 (emphasis added). But in Lovey, this Court

l o See Aplts.' Br. at 17 (claiming that Lovey is the "leading Idaho case in regard to the
enforceability and scope of arbitration agreements" and that Lovey gives a "detailed analysis of
what claims 'arising out of or relating to' a contract with an arbitration clause is subject to
arbitration."); id at 20-21 (claiming what Lovey declares about the permissible scope of
arbitration agreements).
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was specifically construing the phrase "arising out of or relating to" the contract found in the
arbitration clause at issue in Lovey:
The relevant wording from the arbitration clause . . . states,
"Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this Policy,
or the breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration." We have not
previously construed the scope of an arbitration clause applying to
"[alny controversy or claim arising out of or relating to " &
contract.

Lovey, 139 Idaho at 46,72 P.3d at 886 (emphasis added). Therefore, the language in Lovey
regarding limitations on arbitration clauses is applicable only where the clause is expressly
limited to claims "arising out of or relating to" the contract. Lovey's limitation does not apply to
here. The Arbitration Agreement, with its "all controversies . . . which may arise for any cause

whatsoever" language, is significantly broader than the "arising out of or relating to" the contract
language in Lovey. R. Vol. 1 at 58-59

11l,86 113.

Even if Lovey were applicable to evaluate the scope of the Arbitration Agreement,
Plaintiffs would still be required to arbitrate their claims. Lovey holds that the scope of an
arbitration clause (for clauses that use the "arising out of or relating to" the contract language)
also includes tort claims that have their roots,in the parties' contractual relationship:
In the particular situation where contracts provide arbitration for
"any controversy . . . arising out of or relating to the contract . . ."
the courts have held such arbitration agreements sufficiently broad
to include tort, as well as contractual, liabilities so long as the tort
claims have their roots in the relationship between the parties
which was created by the contract.

. . . Arbitration clauses worded as applying to any claim or
controversy "arising out of or relating to the contract" are
sufficiently broad to include tort claims which arise out of or are
related to the contract between the parties or their contractual
relationship.
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Lovey, 139 Idaho at 47, 72 P.3d at 887 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).
In this case, the contractual relationship between Tifani and Defendants began in 1993
when Tifani signed the New Account Card. In 1995, Gillette contacted Tifani after he learned of
the death of her husband Shan to advise her of important paperwork changes that would need to
be made regarding Shan's IRA and her IRA that she had opened in 1993. R. Vol. 2 at 13 1-32
fl3-5.

This contact eventually led to the annuity purchases Tifani made in 1995 that form the

basis for Plaintiffs' clairns. R. Vol. 2 at 132-33 1 6 . Plaintiffs' claims arising from the events in
1995 therefore "have their roots in the relationship between the parties which was created by the

contract" in 1993, which contract included the Arbitration Agreement accepted by Tifani. See

Lovey, 139 Idaho at 47, 72 P.3d at 887. Being thus related to the parties' contractual relationship
that began in 1993, Plaintiffs' alleged tort claims arising in 1995 are within the scope of the
Arbitration Agreement. Id Consequently, even if Lovey were applicable, Plaintiffs' claims are

still within the scope of the Arbitration Agreement.

(2)

The Arbitration Agreement Is NotLimited to IRAs Only.

Plaintiffs argue that the Arbitration Agreement is limited to IRAs because they claim that
the Custodial Account Agreement uses the word "account" to mean IRAs only. Aplts.' Br. at 8
& n.55, 18-20. This argument fails because, first, Plaintiffs incorrectly equate references to "the

'account"' being opened by Tifani, R. Vol. 1 at 80, which refers to the IRA then being opened,
with "any account"that Tifani may have with A.G. Edwards, including any account that she may
have opened "prior. . . or subsequent to" the IRA that caused the adoption of the Custodial
Account Agreement. R. Vol. 1 at 86 113 (emphasis added). That the Custodial Account
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Agreement referred to the IRA as "the 'account"' does not mean that "any account" refers only
to IRAs. Any account means any account, not just any individual retirement account.
More importantly, Plaintiffs' argument ignores that the Arbitration Agreement is not
limited to "the 'account,"' meaning the IRA being opened, or to "any account," which Plaintiffs
argue means to IRAs only. Rather, the Arbitration Agreement expressly applies to "all

controversies" between Tifani and Defendants. R. Vol. 1 at 58-59

7 11, 86 7 13 (emphasis

added). See also R. Vol. 1 at 58 7 10,86 7 12 (stating that the required disclosures did not limit
the "applicability of the . . . arbitration provision to any controversy or claim or issue in any
controversy or claim which may arise between" Tifani and Defendants (emphasis added)). Thus,
even if Plaintiffs were correct that the reference to "any account" in the Arbitration Agreement
meant "any IRA," the Arbitration Agreement still applies to "all controversies" between Tifani
and Defendants, regardless of whether they arise from "the 'account"' or an IRA.''

(3)

The FAA Does NotLimit Arbitration Provisions to Claims
Arising from the Contract Containing the Provision.

There is no support for Plaintiffs' contention that, under the FAA, an arbitration
provision is enforceable only as to claims that arise out of the contract in which the arbitration
provision is found. Aplts.' Br. at 22-23. The only three cases upon which Plaintiffs rely do not
support this argument. In Glazer v. Lehman Brothers, Inc., 394 F.3d 444 (6th Cir. 2005), the
court dealt with "the validity of arbitration clauses when claims of fraudulent inducement are

"

Plaintiffs also argue that Plaintiffs' claims are not subject to the Arbitration Agreement
because "A.G. Edwards does not 'carry' the annuities." Aplts.' Br. at 21. This argument
similarly misses the point that the Arbitration Agreement applies to "all controversies" between
Tifani and Defendants, and not merely to all "accounts" carried by A.G. Edwards.
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raised concerning the making of those clauses," and the statements in Glazer regarding
arbitration clauses not being separate or independent contracts were related to the issue of who
(the court or the arbitrator) was to rule on a claim that the arbitration provision was fraudulently
induced. Id. at 450,452-54. Glazer thus did not address at all whether an arbitration provision
can cover claims arising outside of the contract in which the arbitration provision is found.

Battaglia v. McKendry, 233 F.3d 720 (3d Cir. 2000), and Alticor, Inc. v. National Union Fire
Insurance Co., 41 1 F.3d 669 (6th Cir. 2005), are likewise not helpful to Plaintiffs because both
cases deal with arbitration provisions that expressly limited their application to the agreement
containing the arbitration provision. See Battaglia, 233 F.3d at 722-23, 728-29 (analyzing
whether an arbitration clause in one agreement, which clause provided that the parties to the
agreement would arbitrate "in the event that any controversy arises hereunder," could require
arbitration of a dispute involving another agreement (emphasis added)); Alticor, 41 1 F.3d at
671-73 (evaluating whether a clause requiring arbitration for "[all1 unresolved disputes or
differences arising out of or relating to this Agreement" required arbitration of a dispute relating
to another agreement (emphasis added)). Battaglia and Alticor are therefore inapposite to
whether the FAA limits arbitration provisions to claims arising from the agreement that contains
the arbitration provision when the arbitration provision, like here, has no such express limitation.
Not only are Glazer, Battaglia, and Alticor not supportive of Plaintiffs' argument, but it
has been held in an FAA case that an arbitration clause in one contract may apply to disputes
arising outside of that contract. See Myrick, 195 S.W.3d at 390-92.

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF - 23

(4)

An Implied Term Limiting the Arbitration Agreement to
Disputes Arising from the IRAs Is Contrary to the Express
Terms of the Arbitration Agreement.

Plaintiffs' claim that the Arbitration Agreement contains an "implied" term limiting its
applicability to IRAs, Aplts.' Br. at 23-24, must also fail because such an implied term would be
contrary to the express language of the Arbitration Agreement applicable to "all controversies"
between Tifani and Defendants arising "for any cause whatsoever." R. Vol. 1 at 58-59

113.

7 11, 86

Implied terms cannot be contrary to the contract's express terms. See Idaho Power Co. v.

Cogeneration, Inc., 134 Idaho 738,750,9 P.3d 1204, 1216 (2000) ("No covenant will be implied
which is contrary to the terms of the contract negotiated and executed by the parties."); First Sec.

Bank ofldaho, N A . v. Gaige, 115 Idaho 172, 176,765 P.2d 683,687 (1988) ("There is no basis
for claiming implied terms contrary to express rights contained in the parties' agreement.").
4.

Plaintiffs' Manufactured "Controverted" Facts Do Not Lead to the
Conclusion that the District Court Erred in Dismissing their Case.

Plaintiffs erroneously claim that there are several "critical controverted facts" that make
the District Court's dismissal improper under a summary judgment standard. Aplts.' Br. at 16.
The first problem with this argument is that Plaintiffs did not raise these "critical controverted
facts" before the District Court. Rather, their only attempt to avoid arbitration below, other than
their unconscionability argument discussed below in Section III.A.5, was a purely legal
argument-namely,

ihat the limitations that Idaho law supposedly places on arbitration

agreements meant that the Arbitration Agreement could not, as a matter of law based on Lovey,
apply to their claims. R. Vol. 2 at 117-21. Because this new "critical controverted facts"
argument was not raised by Plaintiffs until this appeal, the argument must be rejected by this
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Court as being raised for the first time on appeal. Blewett v. Klauser, 129 Idaho 612,613,930
P.2d 1357, 1358 (1997) (refusing to address an issue raised "for the first time on appeal").
The second problem with Plaintiffs' "critical controverted facts" argument is that the
"facts" asserted by Plaintiffs are either immaterial or are really legal, notfactual, issues.
Consequently, the result is still that there is no genuine issue of material fact preventing the
conclusion that Defendants are entitled to a dismissal of Plaintiffs' Complaint as a matter of law.
The following paragraphs address the five "factual" issues on page 16 of Appellants' Brief.
Plaintiffs' assertion that Tifani "had no recollection or knowledge of the IRA Agreement
containing the arbitration provision," Aplts.' Br. at 16, simply does not matter. It is undisputed
that (1) Tifani signed the Adoption Agreement, (2) the Adoption Agreement expressly referred to
and incorporated the Custodial Account Agreement, and (3) by signing the Adoption Agreement,
Tifani expressly acknowledged that her agreement with A.G. Edwards "contain[ed] a binding
and enforceable arbitration provision." R. Vol. 1 at 56 1 5 , 5 7 7 8, 63; R. Vol. 2 at 94 1 6 .
Tifani's supposed recollection and knowledge of these matters does not affect these facts.
Moreover, T i h i ' s claim that she does "not remember reviewing" the Custodial Account
Agreement is, as a matter of law, also irrelevant. See, e g , R. Vol. 2 at 94,Y 7. An unsigned
writing may be incorporated by reference into a signed writing even if the contracting party did
not read the unsigned writing. This rule applies to arbitration agreements incorporated by
reference. For example, in Raymond James, the plaintiffs "contend[ed] that the Client
Agreement [containing the arbitration clause] was not attached, as recited in the New Account
Form [that they signed], and they filed sworn affidavits stating that they had not been provided
with a copy of the Client Agreement." Raymond James, 196 S.W.3d at 318. Nevertheless, the
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court held that a "person who signs a contract is presumed to have read and understood the
contract and to have fully comprehended its legal effect" and therefore "presurne[d] that the
[plaintiffs] both read and understood the legal effect of the New Account Form," including the
arbitration agreement that it incorporated. Id. at 3 18-19 (emphasis added).
By their signatures, the [plaintiffs] acknowledged that they had
received, read, understood, and agreed to abide by the terms and
conditions of the Client Agreement. Even if the Client Agreement
was not attached to the New Account Form, and even if the
[plaintiffs] never saw the Agreement, and even if the Client
Agreement was not signed, the [plaintl;ffs]were nevertheless on
notice that there was a Client Agreement, that it contained a
binding arbitration clause, and that it was incorporated into the
New Account Form by reference.

Id. at 3 19 (emphasis added). In Kadow, the plaintiffs similarly "den[ied] [that] they received the
arbitration agreement" in the custodial account agreement. Kadow, 721 F. Supp. at 203. This
claim, as in Raymond James, was of no consequence to the court:
The written contract signed by Mr. Kadow in a separate
section provides "I hereby adopt the A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc.
Custodian Account Agreement . . . ." Below this statement the
agreement states in bold print "[tlhis contract contains a binding
arbitration provision which may be enforced by the parties."
Immediately below this, Mr. Kadow was required to separately
sign the adoption agreement.

. . . Parties entering into a contract have the duty to read
the contracts before they sign them. . . . Thus, the court finds no
basis to deny arbitration of the state law claims.
Id. at 203-04 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). See also Loomis, 104 Idaho at 108,
656 P.2d at 1361 (majority opinion) and 104 Idaho at 113, 118-19, 656 P.2d at 1366, 1371-72
(Bistline, J., dissenting) (affirming the district court's confirmation of the arbitration award
notwithstanding the argument made by the dissent that the arbitration rules that had been
incorporated by reference into the parties' contract "were not attached" to the incorporating
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contract and that the appellant "had never seen them" and was being "obligate[d] . . . to arbitrate
in accordance with certain procedures of which she had no know~ed~e").'~
Thus, by signing the
Adoption Agreement, thereby agreeing to the Custodial Account Agreement and acknowledging
the Arbitration Agreement contained therein, Tifani is bound to arbitrate her claims against
Defendants, whether or not she remembers reading the Custodial Account Agreement.
Next, Plaintiffs' repeated assertion that Defendants "had no knowledge of the documents
purporting to require arbitration until they were 'found' in a scanned archive after the complaint
had been filed," Aplts.' Br. at 16, is entirely irrelevant, as well as being unsupported by the
record. See also id. at 6-7 & 11.45, 16 n.69,27 n.162,28. Again, it is undisputed that (1) the
relevant documents, i.e., the New Account Card and the Custodial Account Agreement, do exist,
(2) the New Account Card bears Tifani's signature on the Adoption Agreement, (3) the Adoption
Agreement expressly incorporates the Custodial Account Agreement and, specifically its
Arbitration Agreement, and (4) the Custodial Account Agreement contains the Arbitration
Agreement. R. Vol. 1 at 56 7 5, 57 fj 8,58-59

7 l l , 6 3 , 86 fj 13; R. Vol. 2 at 94 fj 6.

What

Defendants recall about these particular documents pertaining to this specific customer, or where
A.G. Edwards may have stored the relevant documents, does not affect these undisputed facts.

'* See also Nobles, 122 F. Supp. 2d at 1299-300 (holding that "the parties agreed to
arbitrate" because their "signature to [the] contract manifest[ed] assent to its terms," even though
the plaintiffs contended "that they had no knowledge of the [arbitration] provision" that was
found in the document expressly incorporated into the parties' agreement).
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Two of Plaintiffs' "controverted facts" are related to whether the Arbitration Agreement
was incorporated into the parties' agreement.I3 But these are legal, not fact, issues. The legal
question is: May parties incorporate into their signed document a separate unsigned document
that is expressly referred to and adopted by the parties in their signed document? As discussed
above in Section III.A.3.b, the answer to this purely legal question is yes. Plaintiffs' attempt to
transform this legal question into so-called "controverted facts" is unavailing.
Plaintiffs' final "controverted fact"-that

the Adoption Agreement on the New Account

Card refers to the Arbitration Agreement in a different paragraph (paragraph 12) than where the
Arbitration Agreement is actually found in the Custodial Account Agreement (paragraph 13),
Aplts. Br. at 7, 8, 16-must

also be rejected. First, because Plaintiffs did not raise this "fact"

argument before the District Court, it should not be considered now by this Court. Deal v.
Cockrell, 111 Idaho 127, 129,721 P.2d 726,728 (1986) ("[I]ssues not raised below will not be
considered on appeal."). That Plaintiffs failed to raise this "fact" is significant because
Defendants expressly asserted before the District Court, in Gillette's affidavit, that the Adoption
Agreement referred to Paragraph 13 of the Custodial Account Agreement, not Paragraph 12 as
Plaintiffs now claim. R. Vol. 1 at 57 1 8. Plaintiffs never challenged this explicit "Paragraph
13" assertion before the District Court, and they should not be allowed to do so now.

l 3 See

Aplts.' Br. at 16 ("3. The actual document containing the arbitration clause is
contained within a separate document (IRA Agreement) from the IRA New Account Card
bearing Tifani's name. 4. The IRA Agreement has no reference whatsoever to Tifani or the IRA
New Account Card.").
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Second, even if Plaintiffs' newly raised fact issue is considered, there is nothing in the
record to support their assertion. Admittedly, the copy of the New Account Card in the record is
not the best copy, being a version that has been scanned and copied several times from the
original. R. Vol. 1 at 63. However, Gillette, who reviewed a clearer, earlier generation copy of
the New Account Card, testified unequivocally in his affidavit that the Adoption Agreement on
the New Account Card referred to Paragraph 13. R. Vol. 1 at 57 9 8. In view of Gillette's
uncontroverted testimony regarding the content of the New Account Card, Plaintiffs' belated
attempt to create an issue of fact must be afforded no weigh at all.
Finally, a review of the Adoption Agreement on the New Account Card in the record
shows that the Adoption Agreement refers to Paragraph 13, not 12. A comparison of the "3" in
"paragraph 13" with the earlier "2" in "page 21" on the same line of text shows that the Adoption
Agreement does, in fact, refer to Paragraph 13, not 12.

5.

The Arbitration Agreement Does Not Violate Any Public Policy and Is Not
Unconscionable.

The underlying defect with Plaintiffs' unconscionability arguments is the assumption that
arbitration is unfair to ~1aintiffs.l~
This assumption, however, is exactly what the FAA does not
allow. The FAA was enacted by Congress "[tlo overcome judicial resistance to arbitration" and
"embodies the national policyfavoring arbitration andplaces arbitration agreements on equal
footing with all other contracts." Buckeye Check Cashing, 546 U.S. at 443 (emphasis added).

l4 See, e.g., Aplts.' Br. at 29, 32 (arguing that arbitration had "major ramifications" and
"disadvantages" for Plaintiffs and was "'excessively one sided"' and that arbitration would
"deprive [a person] o f . . . due process and access to the courts").
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Because Plaintiffs' underlying premise that arbitration is unfair to them is contrary to the FAA,
Plaintiffs' unconscionability arguments must be rejected.
Plaintiffs' first unconscionability argument-actually

consisting of various arguments,

the general theme of which is that the Arbitration Agreement is limitless and therefore
unconscionable (Aplts.' Br. at 25-30)-fails

because Plaintiffs cite no case law for the

proposition that an arbitration provision that covers "all controversies" between the parties is
unconscionable. Plaintiffs' failure to cite to any such case law is glaring in view of the cases
cited herein in which courts consistently have enforced such broadly worded arbitration
provisions. See, e.g., Anders, 346 F.3d at 1028; Bybyk, 81 F.3d at 1196, 1199-200; Myrick, 195
S.W.3d at 390-92. Further, Plaintiffs' argument that the Arbitration Agreement is invalid
because there might be some claim between Plaintiffs and Defendants that the Arbitration
Agreement was not intended to cover, and that is not remotely involved in this case, does not
mean that the Arbitration Agreement is unconscionable with respect to the claims in Plaintiffs'
Complaint that plainly have their roots in the parties' broker-client relationship and that the
Arbitration Agreement was obviously meant to cover. Thus, Plaintiffs' "wrongful death"
example, Aplts.' Br. at 29, does not make the Arbitration Agreement unconscionable as to
Plaintiffs' malpractice, negligence, and fraud claims that are directly related to investment advice
and actions that were integral parts of the broker-client relationship that was created at the time
Tifani adopted the Arbitration Agreement.
Moreover, although Plaintiffs quote Lovey to describe the law of unconscionability,
Aplts.' Br. at 26, 29, they fail to explain how the law was applied to the facts in Lovey or what
this Court in Lovey actually concluded. Plaintiffs' omission is understandable: Lovey illustrates
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why the Arbitration Agreement is not unconscionable. In Lovey, the district court concluded that
the arbitration clause was unconscionable for several reasons, for example: the use of an
adhesion contract "constituted procedural unconscionability," Lovey, 139 Idaho at 43,72 P.3d at
883; the plaintiff-insured "did not have an opportunity to read the insurance contract before she
paid the premium," id. at 44, 72 P.3d at 884; the defendant "did not give [the plaintiff-insured] a
reasonable explanation of the arbitration provision," id.; and the arbitration clause was "'[was]
not readily apparent to the consumer"' and was supposedly "hidden." Id. (quoting the district
court). This Court, however, rejected each of these reasons, held that there was no
unconscionability, and reversed the district court:
"[AJn adhesion contract cannot be held procedurally unconscionable solely
because there was no bargaining over the terms" because "[aldhesion contracts
. . . are not against public policy." Id. at 43, 72 P.3d at 883.
There was no evidence for the district court's conclusion "that [the plaintiffinsured] had limited ability to investigate other health insurance contracts"
because there was "no showing that all other health insurers in the relevant market
area also include similar arbitration clauses in their insurance policies." Id.
Because there was "no evidence that [the plaintiff-insured] requested, but was
denied, an opportunity to review a copy of the policy before applying for the
insurance coverage," the procedure of having the insured submit a premium
payment and then receive the written policy did "not provide a basis for finding
procedural unconscionability." Id. at 44,72 P.3d at 884.
There was "no contention . . . that the arbitration provision was ambiguous or that
its wording included complex legalistic language, nor [was] there any evidence
that [the plaintiff-insured] asked any questions about what the provision meant."
Id. The defendant's "failure to offer unsolicited explanations to the various
provisions in its insurance contract [was] not a factor indicating procedural
unconscionability." Id.
There is "no requirement that an arbitration clause appear on a particular page of
the contract," provided the "arbitration clause [is] not inconspicuous or hidden
among other terms in the contract." Id.
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Based on Lovey, Plaintiffs' unconscionability argument fails. As in Lovey, that Tifani
could not bargain with Defendants over the Arbitration Agreement does not render it invalid.
Moreover, there is no evidence that Tifani ever requested that Defendants explain the Arbitration
Agreement to her, or that Defendants denied Tifani the opportunity to review the Arbitration
Agreement before she signed the Adoption Agreement, or that Defendants avoided answering
her questions about the Arbitration Agreement. R. Vol. 1 at 59 7 12. In addition, the Arbitration
Agreement was not written in "complex legalistic language" and was not concealed, because the
Adoption Agreement that Tifani signed expressly referred to the Arbitration Agreement and
indicatedprecisely its location. R. Vol. 1 at 57 18,63. In addition, there is no evidence that
Tifani had any pressures that would have prevented her from thoughtfully investigating other
financial service providers that may have offered terms more to her liking. Accordingly,
Plaintiffs' first unconscionability argument must be rejected.
Plaintiffs' second unconscionability argument, which is based on "consumer protection"
concerns, must be rejected because it was not raised below. Plaintiffs cite to a publication by the
Public Citizen for "facts" supporting the argument that arbitration is inherently unfair to
consumers. Aplts.' Br. at 3 1. Not only is this argument contrary to the national policy favoring
arbitration embodied in the FAA, Buckeye Check Cashing, 546 U.S. at 443, but the entire
"consumer protection" argument, including the "facts" supporting the argument in the
publication by the Public Citizen, were never brought before the District Court and should not be
considered now. Blewett, 129 Idaho at 613,930 P.2d at 1358.
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B.

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN AWARDING ATTORNEYS' FEES
TO DEFENDANTS.

1.

Standard of Review.

"An award of attorney fees and costs is within the discretion of the trial court and subject
to an abuse of discretion standard of review." Smith v. Mitton, 140 Idaho 893,901, 104 P.3d 367,
375 (2004). "The district court's determination of a reasonable amount of attorney fees is a
factual determination to which this Court applies an abuse of discretion standard of review." Id
2.

The District Court Correctly Perceived that Awarding Attorneys' Fees Was
a Matter of Discretion and Properly Considered the Factors Required to
Make the "Prevailing Party" Determination.

Contrary to Plaintiffs' argument that the District Court "failed to conduct any kind of
consideration of the required factors in determining whether a party is entitled to fees," Aplts.'
Br. at 33, the District Court did consider the required factors to make the prevailing party
determination. Under I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B), to make a "prevailing party" determination for
purposes of an award of attorneys' fees, three "principal factors" must be considered: "(1) the
final judgment or result obtained in relation to the relief sought; (2) whether there were multiple
claims or issues between the parties; and (3) the extent to which each of the parties prevailed on
each of the claims or issues." Daisy Mfg Co., Inc. v. Paintball Sports, Inc., 134 Idaho 259,999
P.2d 914 (Ct. App. 2000). The District Court considered these required factors:
Defendants could not have achieved a more favorable outcome.
Even though the matter has not yet been resolved on the merits
through arbitration, a final judgment has been entered in this
action. [Plaintiffs] gained no benefit as a result of the litigation in
this case. Consequently, Defendants are the prevailing parties and
should be awarded reasonable attorney fees.
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R. Vol. 3 at 317 (internal citation omitted). Thus, the District Court's "prevailing party"
determination was proper and must be affirmed.
3.

The District Court Properly Applied the Law in Dismissing the Case and in
Determining that Defendants Were the Prevailing Party.

Plaintiffs' argument that the District Court "failed to follow the law in how to proceed
when arbitration has been ordered," Aplts.' Br. at 35, fails for two reasons. First, Plaintiffs'
argument that the District Court was required to stay, and not dismiss, Plaintiffs' case is
incorrectly based on aprocedural rule o f the FAA, namely 9 U.S.C. 5 3, that does not apply in
state court. Although the substantive provision of the FAA, i.e., 9 U.S.C. 5 2, applies here, the

procedural portions o f the FAA, such as applying for an order to stay the litigation pending
arbitration, 9 U.S.C. 5 3, do not apply in this state-court case. Volt, 489 U S . at 477 n.6; St. Fleur
v. WPI Cable Systems/Mutron, 879 N.E.2d 27, 3 1-32 (Mass. 2008). Therefore, Idaho law, not
the procedural sections o f the FAA (including 9 U.S.C. 3 3), provides the applicable guidelines
regarding what a court should do once it finds that a party's claims are subject to an agreement to
arbitrate. Thus, Plaintiffs' reliance on Section 3 o f the FAA is misplaced.
Second, Idaho law does allow exactly what the District Court did-namely,

dismiss

Plaintiffs' case and create a final judgment. When a valid arbitration provision covers all o f the
claims in a plaintiffs complaint, a district court may properly dismiss the case. In Dan Wiebold,
the "Defendants moved to compel arbitration pursuant to the terms o f the [arbitrationprovision]
and to have the complaint dismissed with prejudice." Dan Wiebold, 142 Idaho at 237, 127 P.3d
at 140. The district court later determined that the relevant arbitration clause was valid "and that
all claims alleged in [the plaintiffs] complaint were subject to arbitration." Id. at 237-38, 127
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P.3d at 14041. The district court then dismissed the action. On appeal, this Court approved of
the district court's dismissal: "Although its order may have the effect of compelling [plaintiff] to
commence arbitration if it desires to pursue its claims, the district court did not compel [the
plaintiff] to participate in arbitration. It dismissed its lawsuit." Id at 238, 127 P.3d at 141
(emphasis added). This Court then explained that the "district court's order dismissing [the]
lawsuit [was] ajna1,judgrnent." Id (emphasis added). As in Dan Wiebold, because the
Arbitration Agreement covers all the claims in Plaintiffs' Complaint, the District Court's
dismissal of Plaintiffs' case, thereby creating a final judgment, was proper.
Further, Plaintiffs' argument that Defendants did not achieve the "most favorable
outcome," because their claims against Defendants "have yet to be adjudicated," Aplts.' Br. at
36, is also flawed. In arguing that the District Court should not have applied Daisy, Plaintiffs
overlook that the results in both cases are substantially equivalent. In both cases, the "'result
obtained' . . . was a dismissal of [the plaintiff s] action with prejudice, the most favorable
outcome that could possibly be achieved by [the] defendant," and the plaintiffs in both cases
"gained no benejt as a consequence of the litigation." Daisy, 134 Idaho at 262,999 P.2d at 917
(emphasis added). The fact that Plaintiffs' claims "have yet to be adjudicated" does not
distinguish this case from Daisy because in Daisy the defendant was found to be the prevailing
party and the plaintiff was held liable for the defendant's attorneys' fees-even

though the

plaintifrs claims in Daisy, like Plaintiffs' claims, had never been adjudicated. Id at 260,999
P.2d at 915-16. It is also notable that based on the result in Daisy-a

dismissal with prejudice-

the Court of Appeals overturned the district court and held that in such a case, the "prevailing
party" factors in I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B), as a matter of law, lead to one conclusion only:
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Under some circumstances application of [the Rule 54(d)(l)(B)]
standards requires a holding that one party is the prevailingpariy
on aparticular claim as a matter of law. This is such a case, for
application of the Rule 54(d)(l)(B) factors can lead only to a
conclusion that [the defendant] was the prevailingparty.

Id. at 262, 999 P.2d at 917 (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted). Similarly, the result
before the District Court-a

complete dismissal of Plaintiffs' action with prejudice-leads

to the

conclusion that, as a matter of law, Defendants are the prevailing parties.
Moreover, there is authority for the specific proposition that a party in whose favor a
court rules on a motion seeking to force another party to arbitrate is the prevailing party entitled
to an award of costs and attorneys' fees, even though the plaintiffs claim may still be brought in
another forum. For example, in 0tay River Constructors v. Sun Diego Expressway, 70 Cal. Rptr.
3d 434 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008), the plaintiff sought to arbitrate its claims against the defendant, but
the defendant refused to submit to arbitration. Id. at 436. The plaintiff then filed a petition with
the trial court to compel the defendant to arbitrate, and the trial court eventually denied the
motion and refused to compel the defendant to arbitrate. Id. at 436-37. Thereafter, the
defendant filed a motion for attorneys' fees and costs, "claiming it was the prevailing party on
the contract because it obtained a final order denying [the plaintiffs] petition to compel
arbitration." Id. at 437. The trial court denied the motion for fees and costs "on the ground it
was not a prevailing party because the parties contemplated additional litigation." Id
The appellate court disagreed, however. The appellate court held that the defendant had
"obtained a simple, unqualified win on the only contract claim at issue in the action-whether to

compel arbitration under [their] Agreement" and that the defendant "was the prevailing party as
a matter of law because it defeated the only coniract claim before the trial court in this discrete
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special proceeding." Id. at 44 1 4 2 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). The
appellate court also rejected the argument that Plaintiffs make here-that

Defendants have not

"prevailed" because the merits of Plaintiffs' claims have yet to be adjudicated:
[The plaintiff] contends the trial court properly determined
that [the defendant] was not a prevailing party because [the
defendant] obtained only an interim procedural victory. [The
plaintiff], however, cited no persuasive authority supporting its
contention and we reject it because courts have awarded attorney
fees to a party obtaining an appealable order or judgment in a
discrete legal proceeding even though the underlying litigation on
the merits was not final.

Id. at 442. The court emphasized that it was appropriate to award fees and costs to the victorious
party because it had obtained in its favor "the final resolution of a discrete legal proceeding." Id.
For the same reasons expressed in Otay River, Defendants' victory on the Motion to
Dismiss makes them the prevailing parties. Defendants "obtained a simple, unqualified win"an outright dismissal of Plaintiffs' case-"on

the only contract claim at issue in the action-

whether to compel arbitration" under the Arbitration Agreement. Id. at 441-42. Defendants are
therefore "the prevailing part[ies] as a matter of law." Id. at 442.
4.

The District Court Correctly Found that There Was a Contractual Basis for
the Attorneys' Fees Award to Defendants.

The prevailing party may receive an award of its attorneys' fees "when provided for by

. . . contract." I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l). Here, the contractual basis for the Attorneys' Fee Award is the
"Attorneys' Fees Provision" in the Custodial Account Agreement, which provides that
[alny expense, including attorney 'sfees, incurred by
[A.G. Edwards] in defense in an action brought by [Tifani] seeking
. . . to recover damages for the activities of [A.G. Edwards] or its
agents or employees in handling any account of [Tifani/ shall be
borne solely by the account, or [Tifani] as the case may be, should
[A. G. Edwards] prevail.
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R. Vol. 1 at 85 7 10 (emphasis added).
Nevertheless, Plaintiffs claim that there is no contractual basis for the Attorneys' Fee

ward."

They first argue that their claims are not subject to the Attorneys' Fees Provision

because their claims are not based on Tifani's IRA or the Custodial Account Agreement (that
includes the Attorneys' Fees Provision). Aplts.' Br. at 37. But this argument ignores that the
Attorneys' Fee Provision is not limited to Tifani's IRA but covers "any expense" incurred by
Defendants in defending an action "brought by [Tifani] seeking . . . to recover damages" for
Defendants' actions "in handling any account of[Tfani/." R. Vol. 1 at 85 7 10 (emphasis
added). Thus, the Attorneys' Fees Provision covers the fees and costs incurred by Defendants to
defend against Plaintiffs' claims related to Defendants' alleged "annuity" advice.
Plaintiffs' second argument-that

Defendants have not prevailed, Aplts.' Br, at 3 7 4 s

addressed above in Section III.B.3. As set forth therein, Defendants achieved a complete
"dismissal of [Plaintiffs'] action with prejudice, the most favorable outcome that could possibly
be achieved by [Defendants]," and Plaintiffs "gained no benefit as a consequence of the
litigation" before the District Court. Daisy, 134 Idaho at 262,999 P.2d at 917. Consequently, as
a matter of law, Defendants are the prevailing parties entitled to an award of fees and costs.
Plaintiffs' third argument-because

the Custodial Account Agreement "contemplates that

all disputes are only to be considered through arbitration," the Attorneys' Fees Provision is

According to Plaintiffs' Complaint, "[tlhis action arises out of [a] commercial
transaction." R. Vol. 1 at 14 7 66. Therefore, if this Court finds that the Attorneys' Fees
Provision does not provide a basis for the Attorneys' Fee Award, the Attorneys' Fee Award may
nonetheless be upheld pursuant to Idaho Code 5 12-120(3).
l5
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limited to expenses incurred in arbitration proceedings only, Aplts.' Br. at 37-must

be rejected

for the simple reason that the Attorneys' Fees Provision has no language limiting its application
to arbitration proceedings only. Rather, it expressly applies to "any expense" incurred by
Defendants in defending against claims brought against them by Tifani. R. Vol. 1 at 85 7 10.
5.

The District Court Properly Exercised Its Discretion in Determining the
Amount of the Attorneys' Fees Award.

Plaintiffs' assertion that the amount of the Attorneys' Fee Award is unreasonable must be
rejected, first, because Plaintiffs failed to properly object before the District Court to the
attorneys' fees requested by Defendants. Plaintiffs failed to provide to the District Court any
specific details as to why the amount of fees claimed by Defendants was unreasonable. Plaintiffs
merely claimed that the amount is excessive because "Defendants have not even yet answered
the original complaint" and that the amount "appear[s] to be out of proportion with what the
normal costs should be for such a motion." R. Vol. 3 at 265-66 (emphasis added). These
observations, however, do not constitute a proper objection to the amount of the requested fees:
A party objecting "to the amount [of attorneys' fees] claimed" must, in "a motion to disallow the
claimed attorney fees," "state with particularity his objections and provide any information he
want[s] the court to consider in support of his objections." Lettunich v. Lettunich, 145 Idaho
746, 750 & n.2, 185 P.3d 258, 262 & n.2 (2008). Before the District Court, Plaintiffs did not file
such a motion and failed to state with any particularity the grounds upon which their conclusory
objection was based. Consequently, this Court should ignore Plaintiffs' "amount" objections.
In addition, contrary to Plaintiffs' assertion, the District Court did consider the required
criteria in I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) in determining the amount of the award. R. Vol. 3 at 3 18-20
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("Considering all of the Rule 54(e)(3) factors, A.G. Edwards should be awarded $15,139.41 in
reasonable computer assisted legal research and attorney fees."). Because a "district court need
not make specific findings demonstrating how it employed any of the factors listed in
Rule 54(e)(3)" and because "the lack of written findings [regarding these factors] in itself cannot
be considered a manifest abuse of discretion," Perkins v. US. Transformer West, 132 Idaho 427,
430, 974 P.2d 73, 76 (1999), the District Court's consideration of the Rule 54(e)(3) factors was
sufficient and within its discretion, and should not be overturned on appea1.l6
This Court should also reject Plaintiffs' argument that the Attorneys' Fee Award is
unreasonable because Defendants spent time on the case before filing their Motion to

is miss.'^

Plaintiffs' argument ignores that the fees that Defendants incurred prior to the Motion to Dismiss
were specifically incurred in an attempt to avoid, for all parties, the fees that would result from
litigating the arbitration issue. The parties mutually agreed to delay the deadline for Defendants'
formal response to the Complaint while the parties addressed the arbitration issue. R. Vol. 3 at
287 77 3-5,292,296. Between February 2008 and September 2008, counsel for Defendants

Furthermore, Plaintiffs' assertion that the "District Court accepted 'carte blanche' the
defendants' request of $15,139.41" is incorrect. Aplts.' Br. at 38; see also id at 3. Defendants
requested $17,628.00 in attorneys' fees and $1,139.41 for computer assisted legal research, for a
total of $18,767.41, R. Vol. 2 at 200, but the District Court awarded Defendants only
"$15,139.41 in reasonable computer assisted legal research and attorneys fees," R. Vol. 3 at 320,
323, or $3,628 less than the amount Defendants requested.
IG

l 7 The attorneys' fees requested by Defendants included only those fees incurred in
procuring the dismissal of Plaintiffs' Complaint in light of the Arbitration Agreement. R. Vol. 2
at 199-202; R. Vol. 3 at 203-09. Defendants' requested fees did not include any fees related to
Defendants' work on the merits of Plaintiffs' claims. R. Vol. 3 at 288 7 7. Hence, Plaintiffs
have not been required to pay for Defendants' fees unrelated to the arbitration issue.

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF - 40

provided Plaintiffs' counsel with numerous background documents and lengthy written
narratives regarding why Plaintiffs must arbitrate. R. Vol. 3 at 287 7 6. But, by September
2008, Defendants were unsuccessful in persuading Plaintiffs to arbitrate, and Defendants thus
responded to the Complaint on October 8,2008, with their Motion to Dismiss. R. Vol. 1 at 51.
Accordingly, the fees incurredprior to the Motion to Dismiss were incurred precisely in an
attempt to avoid the fees being incurred in the present dispute over the arbitration issue and,
therefore. are not excessive or unreasonable.
Further, it was the actions of Plaintiffs and their counsel to avoid the Arbitration
Agreement that increased the fees incurred by Defendants. From the beginning of this case,
counsel for Defendants repeatedly communicated to Plaintiffs' counsel that Plaintiffs' claims
were subject to arbitration. R. Vol. 3 at 23842,287 17 4-5,292,296. Plaintiffs could have
avoided the fees incurred by Defendants by submitting their claims to arbitration at the outset, as
Tifani had agreed to do. See Lettunich, 145 Idaho at 75 1, 185 P.3d at 263 (holding that it is
proper to consider a party's actions that increase the fees for the prevailing party "in determining
the amount of time reasonably required by [the prevailing party's] attorneys").

6.

The District Court's Attorneys' Pee Award Is Notunjust.

Because Defendants achieved a dismissal of Plaintiffs' claims, with prejudice, and
Plaintiffs have gained nothing before the District Court, Defendants are the prevailing parties
entitled to an award of fees. Daisy, 134 Idaho at 262, 999 P.2d at 917. In view of the holding in
Daisy, Plaintiffs' failure to provide any record authority or legal authority at all for their
argument-namely,

that because they are private citizens with limited resources (a fact not in the
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record), "justice and efficiency" should supersede the result required by Rule 54(d)(l)(B),
Aplts.' Br. at 39-necessarily
C.

means that their argument must fail.

DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO ATTORNEYS' FEES ON APPEAL.
Defendants are entitled to an award of attorneys' fees on appeal for the same reasons that

they were entitled to an award of attorneys' fees before the District Court-namely,

the

Custodial Account Agreement contains the Attorneys' Fees Provision, which provides that
Defendants, when they are the prevailing parties, are entitled to attorneys' fees incurred in the
defense of an action brought by Tifani. R. Vol. 1 at 85 7 10. In the alternative, Defendants are
entitled to attorneys' fees pursuant to Idaho Code s12-120(3). See footnote 15

IV.
CONCLUSION
Defendants respectfully request that this Court (I) affirm the orders of the District Court
dismissing Plaintiffs' case and awarding attorneys' fees and costs to Defendants and (2) award
Defendants their attorneys' fees on appeal.
DATED THIS 17th day of September, 2009.
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP

BY
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